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Senior Thesis  
Virtue Ethics and Non-Human Animals: The Missing Link to the Animal Liberation Movement 
 
Abstract 
In this thesis, I will be arguing for a more balanced assessment for the protection and treatment of non-human 
animals while expanding our moral concern to include them. Currently, arguments for what has been coined ‘the 
animal liberation movement’ center around the act of the person toward the animal, yet the character of the 
person is neither questioned nor examined. It is through this concentration that the movement, and ultimately the 
animals, suffers. Classical virtue ethics fills in the gaps left by utilitarianism and deontology by shifting some of 
the attention away from the outcome to the source. Essentially, in order for positive change in the treatment, 
views, and protection of animals to occur more rapidly and thoroughly, we should begin focusing on curing the 
disease and not simply the symptoms. I will set an alternative approach to the movement by including virtue 
ethics, and from this inclusion will begin looking to the cycle of persons receiving their initial traits from role 
models and laws. By encouraging more emphasis on and bringing attention to what it means to be a virtuous 
person towards animals, a paradigm shift will gradually occur to include concern for animals in laws, parenting, 
and socially accepted beliefs and actions. It is within these structures we will find the biggest support in favor of 
animals and their treatment. 
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Introduction 
 While the topic of non-human animals1 and morality has been a heated debate over the 
last several decades, in the United States there is still a deep-seated anthropocentrism – 
human-centered – ideology throughout most of the population. No longer is it that many 
humans believe in the Cartesian view of animals being thoughtless or emotionless much like 
that of a clock of machine-like qualities (Armstrong, 1993), but rather the paradigm shift has 
been towards the belief of human needs coming before animal needs in all situations. 
Scholars, however, have made progress in detailing why the idea behind 
anthropocentrism is not true or ethical, with books like Peter Singer’s “Animal Liberation” 
and Tom Regan’s “The Case for Animal Rights.” These books, and others, have continued 
making progress which some deem as radical changes in the way humans think about and 
respond to animals, their morality, and our treatment of them. These arguments, and the 
hundreds that followed, were what many humans – from activists to those simply questioning 
their beliefs on the topic – were waiting for: a logical, thoughtful explanation of why animals 
matter and why the actions humans, as moral agents, do towards them matter.  
Still, despite these arguments’ obvious contribution to how many now examine the 
topic of animal liberation, something is missing. Singer’s arguments rely on utilitarianism and 
Regan’s on deontology – both action-focused ethical theories – and while the outcome of 
actions matters hugely to animals and their protections, the actual morality of the person 
performing such actions has remained rarely discussed. For this, virtue ethics should be 
implemented among these theories and, for there to be a more progressive shift in the way 
                                                 
1
 I will now refer to ‘non-human animals’ as ‘animals’ for the sake of brevity. When I refer to animals, I am 
excluding human beings despite their belonging to such a category.  
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humans view animals, we must concentrate on the virtues and character of the humans within 
a society rather than simply on their actions. It is imperative to give a greater focus now to 
revising laws, revisiting virtues concerning animals, and addressing inconsistencies in our 
approach towards animals.  
 
Overview 
I will be arguing that the animal liberation movement is missing a key factor in its 
implementation and effectiveness: virtues and character traits must move beyond only acting 
morally neutral or inconsistent towards animals and instead should shift these virtues into 
their consistency, thus including animals in moral value. I will be using “moral value” on the 
same grounds as moral consideration – moral value, when given, constitutes someone worthy 
of being considered in morally important decisions/actions. In other words, in saying non-
human animals have moral value, I am asserting arguments have shown animals possess 
sufficient qualities to be deserving of moral consideration and are receivers of such 
consideration. Using classical virtue ethics as a foundation to build on, I will establish that our 
virtues help determine much of our actions, often left out of utilitarian or deontological 
argument, which the progression of positive change for animals relies on. Once this is 
established, I will move to the implementation of such virtues and character building. Virtue 
ethics depends heavily on how we come to know morally significant virtues – relying on role 
models, examining others’ actions, and, “following certain rules.” (Annas, 2003) I will further 
define what this reliance means and why continually checking for inconsistencies in our 
beliefs and behavior is a necessary condition of being a virtuous person. I will then 
concentrate on role modeling behavior being dependent upon actual virtuous, or moral, 
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persons to then teach others by example. Through this role modeling behavior, I will 
specifically turn attention to the rules portion of virtue ethics. Rules, or how I will be 
interpreting them for the animal liberation movement, laws, teach us early on what is deemed 
okay and not okay – often with moral undertones, such as the prevalent thought of virtue 
jurisprudence. It is from these laws we begin gauging what is important – such as honesty, 
compassion, or justice – which we slowly define throughout our lifetime. For the treatment of 
animals to be improved upon with lasting change and equality, the argument for what is 
considered virtuous must expand to animals. 
 
Theoretical Foundation 
 The age-old question of “How should I live my life?” has been well addressed in 
philosophy and other disciplines across the board. The question is essential to both self-
interest and interest in others, including animals. Many would agree that one should live in 
correspondence with being a good person in the best way possible, but what does being a 
good person entail and how should it affect others? Virtue ethics, specifically classical virtue 
ethics, approaches this question with a reliance on virtues and vices. A virtue is “a good, or 
admirable, or praiseworthy character trait” whereas a vice is “a bad, or despicable or 
unpraiseworthy character trait” (Hursthouse (2), 147).  
In directing the asker to an answer for their question of how to live, virtue ethics looks 
to the idea of the “virtuous person.” A virtuous person is someone who has, and exercises, 
those character traits we collectively grant praise and admiration towards – generosity, 
honesty, compassion, kindness, trustworthiness etc. It is not enough to simply act on what is 
seen to be virtuous without intent, but rather to be a virtuous person whole heartedly; the 
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virtuous character trait should resonate in all aspects of the person’s character. In this way, 
virtue ethics is agent-based (as opposed to action-based, such as with utilitarianism which 
does not necessarily care about the intent of the agent doing the action, but rather only with 
the action and outcome itself) and this it focuses on, among other things, how “the unity of 
character is extremely labyrinthine. It couples systematically a person’s values, choices, 
desires, strength or weakness of will, emotions, feelings, perceptions, interests, expectations, 
and sensibilities” (Hursthouse, 12). For example, if someone is an honest person, one must 
not simply refrain from telling a lie but one would also refrain from being involved in lies, 
would admire those who tell the truth and look down on those who lie, would go out of their 
way to make the truth known (even if the lie is in their favor), etc. Once these virtues are 
acquired, they are embedded within the person yet will need ongoing nurturing (such as 
societal nurturing) to be sustained (Hursthouse, 12). But where do we acquire such virtues? 
Through role models, teachers, and rules (laws) (Annas, 2003) we acquire at minimum a set 
standard of what is and isn’t virtuous and how these virtues are applied morally. It is then we 
begin to think more for ourselves and we deepen our commitment to certain virtues – maybe 
one person really values honesty and justice – so we are able to make these virtues consistent 
in both our thoughts and our actions.  
A definitive list of traits for both virtues and vices is not necessary since, as is found to 
be the case, recognizing these sorts of traits is of common-sense practicality. We observe and 
judge traits others have and compartmentalize them accordingly – are they virtues, vices, or 
do they remain neutral? Virtue ethics, derived from the work of Aristotle, focuses on 
eudaimonia – or flourishing of life – for the principle of what we are aiming for in our 
character and in our actions. Essentially, it could readily be agreed upon without much 
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assumption that the goal of living a ‘good life’ is to reach true happiness and to flourish in 
aspects of the self. This “flourishing” criterion could be used as a standard to classify these 
traits. Currently, however, this flourishing through behavior is stunted or, as Hursthouse 
denotes it, there are “imperfect degrees of virtues” (Hursthouse, 14) partly because most of 
our virtues do not translate into moral consideration for all animals with sentience. If someone 
were to murder someone (a human), outside of self-defense, our intuition, associated with the 
act of flourishing, tells us that this person acted under a vice trait and is not leading a life 
towards eudaimonia. However, people consistently murder non-human animals and, 
depending on the exceptions in our culture with domesticated animals, this act is not seen as a 
vice and the person’s eudaimonia is rarely viewed as being affected. 
I draw this parallel between how one responds to the killing of a human compared to 
the killing of an animal to help facilitate that currently, we are a people who have a lackluster 
response to how most animals are treated in terms of how we are to live as a moral being. 
Those typically deemed “virtuous people” are, more often than not, people who practice daily 
harms to animals, whether this is the foods they choose to eat and the products they choose to 
buy or their general feeling of an animal suffering. Despite these choices, they are still judged 
as virtuous if their character traits line up with what is good for themselves and other humans. 
Virtue ethics does look to indirect actions and non-actions as similarly situated as direct 
actions. It is not enough to simply refrain from directly participating in cruelty, such as being 
the individual who skins a fox alive for their fur; one must not be party to such actions 
indirectly, such as purchasing the fur, or knowingly choosing to remain ignorant or inactive, 
such as witnessing the skinning but doing nothing to prevent it. Simply put, “There is a large 
gap between not being cruel and being truly compassionate…” (Hursthouse, 2006) and it is 
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the truly compassionate (or the truly honest, the truly loyal, etc.) which constitutes a virtuous 
person. 
Hursthouse and others describe an “imperfect virtuous agent” as someone who has yet 
to reach the plateau of being a virtuous person despite having some characteristics associated 
with being one. The imperfect virtuous agent is still learning what it means to be a virtuous 
person; they are still susceptible to making wrong decisions and having vices.  For example, 
someone who is rather honest in her life pays for an item and receives more money in return 
than what was her due change. The “imperfect virtuous agent” would still wrestle with the 
debate between upholding her honest virtue by returning the money and the temptation to 
selfishly gain from the mistake – the priority of honesty being a true virtue has yet to be 
established in a way in which it is whole heartedly met. It is this conception of how virtues 
should be applied which I will later expand on as “incomplete” virtues in the realm of our 
treatment of and feelings towards animals, specifically examining compassionate behavior. 
Of course a “perfect person” may only exist in theory, but classical virtue ethics 
focuses on more of a holistic approach rather than nit-picking each trait a person may or may 
not have. With that said, I do not contend that a completely or perfectly virtuous person is 
possible in saying most people are “imperfect” or “incomplete.” This is not the dichotomy I 
am making, but rather I am stating there are incomplete aspects of virtues preexisting because 
they do not address animals.  As Joel Kupperman states in his discussion of virtues, “human 
beings have character without (a) believing in human perfection, or (b) thinking that character 
is static” and he furthers this by adding the “stipulation of human perfection does not suggest 
then that peoples’ characters do not differ sharply” (Kupperman, 2009; 244). I mention this 
because there is an important difference to be made. I am not treating “imperfect” or 
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“incomplete” in terms of their needing their opposites, such as an “imperfect person” existing 
because of a “perfect person” existing, but rather I am treating this terminology as missing 
something – animal moral consideration – and this ‘missing’ component is the ‘incomplete’ 
component. 
 
Objections to Virtue Ethics 
One of the biggest objections to virtue ethics is one I would like to resolve early on. 
This is the objection of agent-centered versus action-centered concerns. Many scholars look at 
virtue ethics as being a guideline of the type of person someone should be (agent-centered, 
such as “What type of person should I be?”) but criticizes that virtue ethics does not give 
guidance as to the type of actions someone should take to be such a person (action-centered, 
such as “What actions should I take to be such a person?”). This has lead into virtue ethics 
being accused of “Being rather than Doing” (Hursthouse, 25) which gives us no instruction on 
how one should live, thus being useless in ethical application. Since virtue ethics is focused 
on the virtues of a person and not necessarily the outcome of the actions that person takes, its 
objectors often view virtue ethics as a supplement to deontology and utilitarianism; practical 
to be added into discussion of other ethical theories but not substantial enough to hold its own 
due to its failure to provide action guidance, such as rules or principles that focus on the 
action itself. 
This objection, however, seems to be misunderstanding virtue ethics’ premise of 
deploying specifications of right action (action-centered) by using an agent (virtuous person). 
Before I proceed, I must note that I am not using ‘right action’ here as it is usually used (in 
terms of ‘right’ and ‘wrong’) but rather, I use Hursthouse’s definition of right action “in the 
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sense of a good or excellent action, one that gets a tick of approval, and ‘wrong’ as a bad or 
vicious action” (Zyl, 2011) because it more accurately follows virtue ethics.  In understanding 
the actions a virtuous person would take by possessing such virtuosic characteristics, we can 
begin to see how virtue ethics uses a list of traits to follow as one would define ‘right action’ 
(Hursthouse, 19). It is with these ‘catalogues’ of traits one would come to define a virtuous 
person under a set of guidelines in how to live, while this person later becomes a role model 
for others. While this list is an abstract idea, not defined in full detail as a finite list, it is 
harbored in similarities between what is deemed praiseworthy and what is deemed 
unfavorable, something we must begin to expand to animals of all species now that solid 
arguments have been made for their moral value.  
Furthermore, there lies a distinction between explanatory accounts and substantive 
accounts of right action. Here, explanatory accounts of right action would look to an 
explanation of what makes an action right and substantive accounts of right action would look 
to what these right actions all have in common. Much assumption is placed on virtue ethics 
answering both of these questions, but instead virtue ethics focuses on substantive accounts of 
right action only; it acts as a practical guide to allow us to recognize a right action: it does not 
claim that an action is right because a virtuous person performed it but rather that a virtuous 
person would perform such an action. (Zyl, 2011) 
So, although virtue ethics remains agent-centered in its foundation, it is as capable of 
presenting actions one should take – answering the question “How should I live?” – and 
determining the consequences of such actions as other theories do: either being a virtuous or a 
non-virtuous person.  The virtuous person is thus exemplary of how one should act and is, 
thus, the action guidance for virtue ethics. This exemplar behavior also stems from not only 
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individuals but from our moral education, such as rules/laws, which I will examine at length 
later. 
It should be noted, due to the explanation of this distinction, that there is another 
distinction to be made within substantive accounts of right actions: action guidance and action 
assessment. This distinction, albeit a trivial one, serves the purpose of helping someone 
understand what was right and what was wrong. However, this leads us into another 
objection. It seems virtue ethics would run into problems with both the virtues themselves 
coming into conflict and the available actions someone has available to them. This objection, 
therefore, is twofold. 
First, if one is to do what a virtuous person would characteristically do, what is 
someone supposed to do in situations which offer no right outcome? Other ethical theories 
solve this through their rules or principles of action guidance – either you perform the action 
which will maximize happiness/minimize pain or you perform the action which will not 
infringe upon someone’s moral rights and follows a rule-set. These outcomes, then, are right 
action. Virtue ethics, however, does not have this equipped within its framework; if one is to 
do what a virtuous person would do but no options allow for such behavior, action guidance is 
completely severed. For example, let us take the original trolley problem introduced by 
Philippa Foot which involves an evil madman who tied four people to one side of a train track 
and one person to the other side. He then puts you in control, forcing you to decide whether to 
either pull a train-track lever resulting in the death of the one individual but saving the four, or 
not pulling the lever and having the four die but not killing the one as passivity (with all 
individuals being equal). (Owens, 2004) The utilitarian would pull the lever to save the four 
from death, resulting in the killing of one. Deontologists would take the passive approach 
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under the rule of “One should not kill” and would not pull the lever, saving one while the 
other four die as a result of inaction. What would a virtue ethicist do? It is unclear. 
Before I respond, I wish to make a quick side-step, for this objection seems very 
prevalent to my argument of including animals in our decisions of which actions we should 
take in order to be a virtuous person leading a flourishing life. There are many instances in 
which human and animal interest conflict with each other and decisions must be made. Let’s 
say instead of a mad man tying individual humans to train tracks, the mad man tied four dogs 
(or pigs, or gorillas, or sheep) to one side of a train track and one human to the other side. 
Does this change any of the decisions other ethical theories would make? It would depend 
heavily on the type of approach the ethical theory takes (such as whether a utilitarian 
considers humans and animals as equal or takes into consideration relationship connections 
they may have) but it need not matter in this discussion. What matters is how a virtue ethicist 
would respond. Is it still unclear as before or has it changed? I argue, while it is not as unclear 
as some may think (which I will shortly address), it should not change. However, the current 
standard of what being a virtuous person is seems to say a different story, following 
‘incomplete virtues.’ While I remain aware that human individuals may have more awareness 
of what is happening to them (such as impending death), or could happen, to them and they 
typically have stronger ties to other individuals, I contend the humans’ and animals’ moral 
value should be considered in the same way for the sake of being a virtuous person, which I 
will shortly discuss in further detail. 
Following this example of whether one should kill four animals to save one human, 
we can expand the virtue of benevolence. Under, what could be described as, currently 
accepted social norms in the United States, it would be viewed as right action to kill the four 
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animals to save the one human. This leads us back to the anthropocentric view of humans 
coming before animals in times of conflict (from humans’ food customs coming before an 
animal’s life to direct death-or-death situations like the revised trolley problem). Again, it is 
here which I argue that this is actually not benevolent in virtue to simply assert hierarchy over 
animals by killing four to save one. This is especially wrong since it, unlike the deontologist 
position of non-action which involves not switching the lever, involves direct action of 
switching the lever over to save the one human individual. If details of the individuals’ 
species were unknown, this active choice of killing four to save one seems illogical and 
immoral through our basic intuitions so why would one remain benevolent by doing so? I 
argue they would not. (Zyl, 2011) I am not asserting here that one should kill the one human 
to save the four dogs definitively, but rather the decision should not be swiftly came to and 
the outcome , if the four dogs were killed, should stem similar feelings of sadness, regret, etc. 
as would occur if the individuals killed were human. There should be the same type of tragic 
dilemma involved as would be if only humans were involved if one was practicing as a more 
complete virtuous character. 
So, going back to the objection at-hand, how would virtue ethicists respond to the 
original trolley problem? Although there is no definitive answer to go after, it could easily be 
assumed a virtuous person would do what will continue their ability to live a virtuous life. 
This problem, however, leads into, what Hursthouse considers a “tragic dilemmas.” These are 
situations which inhibit right action, as defined as “an act that merits praise rather than blame, 
an act that an agent can take pride in doing rather than feel unhappy about, the sort of act that 
decent, virtuous agents do and seek out occasions for doing” from occurring. (Hursthouse, 
1999) Even if one would do what a “virtuous person would characteristically do,” (Ibid) 
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performing a right action, or in other words feeling happy about or taking pride in – as a 
virtuous person – the action performed, is thus impossible. It would be figured killing the one 
to save the four would, more likely than not, be viewed as a more practical action to take but 
would the person who pulled the lever feel proud of killing the one individual to save the 
four? I’d argue, assuming they were virtuous, they would not. They would probably, instead, 
feel quite remorseful for the life lost and would not find happiness in their decision – rather, it 
was simply something that had to be done. So, in this way, virtue ethics does not give a means 
as to how to approach these kinds of situations as other ethical theories do, but rather it relies 
on a more practical approach: situations like this are terrible and there is no morally or 
virtuously correct action to take, but rather there is one that is more virtuous or correct than 
another.  
The second part of the objection concerns the virtues themselves. Often situations 
cause conflicting priorities and concerns – virtues are not consistent with one another all of 
the time. A very common example of this is the virtue of honesty and the virtue of kindness. 
Telling the truth to someone can cause immense pain to them, which would not be kind but if 
one is to be honest, one must tell the truth. So a conflict arises between telling the truth and 
being unkind or being kind but not telling the truth. These conflicts happen more often than 
not (there almost always seems to be some sort of struggle of doing what a virtuous person 
would do because both choices have positives and negatives associated with them) and virtue 
ethics seems to fail to give an appropriate means in which to decide, once again not providing 
action guidance to someone seeking an answer as to what they should do. Questions then 
come up regarding whether there are certain virtues that are more important than others or if 
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there is a way to know which decision is actually the virtuous one or, even, if there is a “more 
virtuous” decision. 
This objection is applied to both virtue ethics and deontology (by replacing virtues 
with rules) and both theories respond the same; the conflict is merely “apparent” and upon 
closer examination and more accurate application of the theory, one notices there is a fairly 
obvious answer as to which decision to make. (Hursthouse, 1999) If we are to go back to the 
honesty and kindness example, most times telling the truth (even if it initially has unkind 
results) would be the more virtuous decision because keeping a lie from someone rarely 
benefits them, especially in the long run. This is not to say some virtues have more 
importance in their holding, but rather that each situation typically has virtues that are tied 
into its being. The virtue of honesty is obviously tied into the situation of whether to tell the 
truth or not; it is essentially asking you whether you will be honest or not. Following this 
example, other virtues, such as kindness, are indirectly associated to the meaning. If one is a 
virtuous person, with an understanding of virtues, these types of conflicts will not be seen as 
conflicts at all.  
  
Why Animals Matter Morally 
 The moral status of animals has long been argued in philosophy but I wish to only 
give a brief account of the two most popular, renowned, and modern arguments in favor of 
animal moral value. I do this to further legitimize my argument insofar that something is 
missing from these theories, despite their invaluable contribution to the movement. The two 
theories, deontology and utilitarianism, focus on the outcome of what is occurring to the 
animal during their lifetime, with little mention of the character traits behind such outcomes.  
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 In his groundbreaking book ‘The Case for Animal Rights’, Tom Regan gives animal 
moral value philosophical credibility. Regan argues that animals are “subjects-of-a-life,” a 
term he defines as “a conscious creature having an individual welfare that is important to it 
even if that welfare is useless to others” (Regan, 144). Due to animals meeting and 
maintaining the “subject-of-a-life” criteria Regan had laid out, he goes on to say animals have 
moral rights to life and bodily integrity, among other things, just the same as humans do. 
Regan, however, does make note that these rights do not foolishly grant animals all rights 
humans have, such as the right to vote or the right to freedom of speech, but instead it grants 
those moral rights that apply towards animals’ lives. Regan exemplifies this with his respect 
principle which states “We are to treat those individuals who have inherent value in ways that 
respect their inherent value” (Regan, 248). It is here, for Regan, animals receive their moral 
value. 
Little is noted on the character of the moral agent acting for or against an animal in 
Regan’s work. Rather here Regan is concerned with the animals themselves: subjects-of-a-life 
are entitled to certain rights and these rights must be granted through duty. It is with such a 
notion I place virtue ethics as being extremely important to the implementation of such rights. 
Just as one would presumably argue women having rights, it is up to the moral fiber – or 
character – of the majority in a society to grant such rights for the rights to actually have an 
impact on women’s lives. We could testify, as Regan does, that animals have basic rights 
which should be upheld but it is not until the character of the majority granting and upholding 
these rights – which I argue is necessary for being a virtuous person – will there begin to be 
drastic improvement in the lives of animals (through their receiving of such rights). 
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 Peter Singer, in his highly acclaimed book ‘Animal Liberation,” approaches the 
question of how we are to treat animals through utilitarianism. Singer denies that animals (and 
humans alike) have moral rights but rather that legal rights exist to minimize suffering. To 
this extent, humans and animals do not share the same set of rights since “there are obviously 
important differences between human and other animals, and these differences must give rise 
to some differences in the rights that each have” (Singer, 2).  Instead of focusing on rights and 
duty for his argument, he focuses on maximizing the greatest good, with each individual 
receiving equal consideration in the equation.  
Singer’s criterion for moral consideration for animals is based on sentience, or their 
ability to feel pain and pleasure, and he argues against speciesism. Speciesism is on-par with 
racism or sexism – it is the act of discrimination of an individual from a different species than 
one’s own because of their belonging to a different species. Singer argues that other methods 
of fitting the moral consideration criteria are speciesist since these other methods of criteria 
(such as intelligence, rationality, and language which have all been largely argued for) are not 
uniformly found in every individual of a species. This is true even when that individual is 
given moral consideration (almost exclusively this hypocrisy is found in our relationships 
towards other humans, but sometimes can also be seen in our relationship towards companion 
animals). This idea of speciesism seems to be empirically spot-on and a major problem with 
the inconsistencies found in the virtues of humans. 
To give one example, human babies do not possess language and are scientifically 
looked at as less intelligent and rational than many adult non-human animals. Despite this, 
human babies are still afforded moral consideration while the other, more intelligent and/or 
rational, animals are not. These actions are speciesist; they are attempting to discern that 
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simply because the human baby happens to be a human it is granted moral value for no further 
reason other than his/her species, whereas those who meet the stated guidelines are not, other 
animals are not granted the same moral value because they’re not human. Furthermore, these 
sorts of criteria are sometimes reversed in that it isn’t such that a human “lacks” some moral 
criteria yet still receives moral value, but instead that an animal possesses such a moral 
criteria which affords moral value to humans yet the animal still does not receive moral value. 
A famous example of this is Koko, a gorilla who has learned American Sign Language, 
knowing approximately 2,000 English words and is able to communicate effectively using 
these words with humans. (Koko) If one, as is often the case, uses language as a moral criteria 
to afford someone moral value, Koko should definitely have moral value but she remains 
without its application. This is outright speciesism. Moral value then, according to Singer, is 
based on sentience. Sentience thus avoids speciesism and instead is based on maximizing 
happiness and minimizing pain with all parts being equal. 
Peter Singer’s argument not only strengthens why we should consider animals in our 
moral value, it, in some ways, more importantly picks out the inconsistencies within our 
justifications for currently excluding many animals from this moral value. Many humans are 
speciesist, sometimes without recognizing it; they view humans as a ‘top tier’ species, with all 
other species being secondary or lesser-than, sometimes even supporting the idea that the only 
use(s) an animal has is what s/he can do for humans. This huge inconsistency in the majority’s 
thoughts and behaviors may have been pointed out by Singer and others, but utilitarianism 
does not give someone the essential tools to remedy this inconsistency on a personal level; 
they may recognize it as wrong, foolish, or unsupported to have these inconsistent beliefs but 
they are not given an actual practical approach to ‘fixing’ it on a personal level, but rather on 
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a broader level that sometimes separates the individual from the action. Virtue ethics, 
however, is remedial to just this: it gives the tools necessary for someone to maintain 
consistency in both intention and action while living a flourishing life by doing what a 
virtuous person would characteristically do (and in this case, a completely virtuous person 
would consider their incorporation of animals in their moral value). 
So, while the leading arguments of today which are in favor of animal moral value 
have been deemed worthy by many, they lack the key ingredients of character development, 
and thus of follow-through and follow-up. Establishing that animals have moral rights or 
establishing animals are sentient so they therefore should be protected is a huge gain to the 
movement in that it offers legitimacy. However, the lack of attention on the humans required 
to make these legitimate arguments work is concerning. Animals’ protection against abuses, 
grievances, suffering, and being used merely as a means should be included, rather than being 
left out, within our efforts to lead a virtuous life and in our efforts to argue efficiently for 
these protections. 
 
The Necessary Next Step 
 Singer, Regan, and countless others have done a great service to the animal liberation 
movement with their approaches. Establishing animals as viable and deserving beings worthy 
of moral value created the avalanche of grassroots campaigns, legislation initiatives, and 
thousands of people taking notice to both their own actions and the actions of others. 
However, while change is slowly occurring throughout the world for various instances of 
animal cruelty – from agriculture to fashion to trapping and hunting – systematic, long-
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standing change is still slow. For example, in the United States, about 5% of its population is 
vegetarian (refraining from eating meat) and about half that is comprised of vegans (refraining 
from animal products in general) (Humane Research Council, 2011), and while these numbers  
are minimally increased each year (Ibid), they are still too significantly low (this percentage 
equates to roughly 7.9 million adult vegans within a society of 311.5 million adults total) to 
expect a withstanding difference for animals within factory farms, with factory farms abusing 
and killing billions of animals annually in the United States alone. (Ibid) It is here that I argue 
this change, and others, are remaining so slow and inconsistent due to the resistance from the 
majority who, regardless of understanding Singer’s and Regan’s arguments, either do not 
know how to go about addressing this understanding or do not see the significance between it 
and their own behavior. 
 There has been too long of a focus on showing animals’ worth for moral value and not 
enough attention to the agents involved in making this moral value matter. One can say 
someone has a right2 to something and this right could be true, but until enough individuals 
decide to grant this right it remains a fanciful concept – meaningful in its theory but worthless 
in its application. It is here which the animal liberation movement has rested for quite some 
time and it is here where focusing on developing more complete virtuous persons is vital for 
its progression. 
Previous arguments for animals’ moral value or moral rights hung from the principle 
to ‘not be a party to practices that cause suffering or infringe on someone’s intrinsic rights.’ 
                                                 
2
 I do not mean “right” as in moral or legal rights, but rather in regards to something belonging to someone and 
them having ownership of either it: either a tangible object, such as a house, or to something more abstract, such 
as privacy. 
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(Hursthouse, 2006) This gives action guidance but only when the action is affecting the agent. 
Hursthouse gives an example of this with cosmetics and animal testing. Those who purchase 
cosmetics are, by these theories, given action guidance which states not to purchase or use 
cosmetics that use animal experimentation. This, however, only applies to those who, for 
whatever reason, purchase and use cosmetics. It is dependent on what someone can do in a 
given situation. This could then be expanded to medical experimentation in which an agent 
may agree with the argument of experimentation being cruel and/or that it infringes upon the 
moral rights of the animals being experimented on, but this is where the argument and 
agreement tends to stop. (Ibid) The current theories tell us something is wrong but unless 
we’re involved, directly or indirectly, it does not tell us what we need to do or why we should 
care to do it. Unless I end up in the hospital needing medical help, I am not in a position to 
make a decision about the medicine which elicits experimentation. It is at this figurative fork-
in-the-road that virtue ethics comes in to bridge the theory and the action from the theory 
together by introducing us to our own character, not just our actions and decision-making. 
At this time, it is important for me to distinguish between arguing that previous 
approaches are not correct or substantial and from what I am actually doing, which is arguing 
previous approaches are simply not sufficient enough at this point in discussing animals’ 
moral value. ‘Animal Liberation’ and ‘The Case for Animal Rights’ were written in 1975 and 
1985, respectively, so while these ethical theories’ approaches were necessary in establishing 
animals as worthy of moral value, it now seems slightly redundant, after hundreds of scholars 
after them wrote similar books, to continue focusing all of the attention on their arguments 
without further expansion. So presently, it need not matter whether someone leans towards 
agreeing with Singer’s utilitarianism conclusion of maximizing happiness and minimizing 
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pain, with animals being included in the equation, or if someone agrees with Regan’s 
subjects-of-a-life criteria, asserting animals have basic moral rights which should be afforded 
to them. Both of these ethical arguments get at the crux of one of the issues at hand: do 
animals have moral value and why? Once someone is able to latch on to the rationale behind 
one of these arguments, it is here where virtue ethics would be a necessary component in 
completing the puzzle. One could also disagree with both of these theories yet turn to virtue 
ethics alone for guidance in how they are to live in accordance to animals if they were to 
include animals in their scope of living a flourishing life. Either way, I argue virtue ethics is a 
necessary component for the animal liberation movement because it is the humans’ actions 
towards animals which cause the most distress and suffering to the animals as a whole and it 
is the humans’ actions, mixed with their intentions, which determine the outcome of what 
occurs to the animals. 
This is why encouraging virtuous character, rather than only setting a standard for 
moral value, is pivotal in evoking positive change, and why without it the movement is met 
with such resistance. The majority of people in the United States, I argue, do not see the 
connection between understanding an animal may be worth moral value and their attempts in 
living a flourishing life. Their actions could come about for a variety of reasons: one may act 
a certain way because it’s socially accepted, lawful, their under pressure to do so, or they wish 
to live a flourishing life, with the latter being viewed as the most important. But without an 
actual change to include animals’ moral value, lasting retention for the treatment and view of 
animals will remain only slight. Currently the exclusion of respecting animals’ moral value is 
socially accepted, it is lawful, many are not under a pressure to do so, and it is not seen as 
being tied up with the ability of living a flourishing life.  
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The Virtue of Compassion 
Previously, I discussed the idea of what Hursthouse calls “imperfect degrees of 
virtues” (Hursthouse, 2006). I then renamed this basic idea ‘incomplete virtues’ to better fit 
my argument linguistically because, while many may agree that someone is virtuous, they 
may not actually be completely virtuous in a trait. 
These traits may be seen as incomplete because of ignorance and/or because there has 
been little to no nurturing of certain ‘missing’ traits. This nurturing must extend throughout 
the lifetime. It is not enough to be a child and have your mother tell you it is wrong to steal so 
you refrain from stealing a candy bar. This nurturing must be ongoing and the refrainment of 
stealing must be ongoing. Similarly, it is not enough for a parent to tell their child not to pull 
the cat’s tail, but again must be an ongoing nurturing. This concept of an incomplete virtue 
compared to a seemingly complete virtue (not to be confused with an actual complete virtue, 
which includes animals) can be attested with the much admirable virtue of compassion.3 
Compassion is one of the easiest virtues to apply to persons; it does not take much knowledge 
to be compassionate and in many cases, much effort. From early on, beginning as toddlers, 
most people are taught to be compassionate people at least to some degree. It is also a virtue 
that I would say is one that many people recognize as being extremely important. An 
uncompassionate person is, to my belief, one of the worst vices someone could have due to 
the relationship it shares to other virtues, such as loyalty or benevolence. It seems compassion 
                                                 
3
 I am defining compassion here as “Sympathetic awareness of others' distress together with a desire to alleviate 
it.” (http://www.virtuescience.com/virtuelist.html, accessed April 20, 2012). 
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has an important linkage with many other virtues, and because of this, I will use it as my 
example.  
An individual may think of himself as a compassionate person – he cares about those 
around them, he feels sympathy for others in times of struggle, he goes out of his way to help 
someone in need – but he often fail to extend this compassion to animals.4 This failure to 
recognize the exclusion of animals in their contemplation of actions creates incompleteness to 
the virtue. For virtue ethics, it is simply not enough to be compassionate in some instances 
and uncompassionate in others (Hursthouse, 1999). There not only has to be a consistency 
involved in someone’s virtues but a whole heartedness to both their intent and their actions. 
One cannot claim compassion as a virtue because of their intention and actions to humans 
alone; one must be compassionate throughout towards all beings with moral value. 
Therefore, when we consider someone compassionate, we should include their 
compassion towards animals to practice a completed virtue. It is not sufficient enough to 
claim someone who is compassionate towards humans as compassionate enough or 
compassionate altogether. There is more to the virtues, such as compassion, than what it 
means to be x to humans. One should, if they wish to live a truly flourishing life, begin 
including what it means to be x to animals. Until then, we are incomplete in our virtues. If I 
go out of my way to help a human in need but I walk past a bird in obvious distress – limping, 
bleeding, chirping incessantly, etc. – and I do nothing to try to help, there is something highly 
inconsistent with calling myself (or having anyone call me) a compassionate person. It seems 
                                                 
4
 I will note an exception to this in U.S. society with companion animals; most people would not find someone to 
be compassionate if they were directly cruel towards a dog or a cat, such as violently kicking a dog or starving a 
cat to death. However, with that said, this does not touch on the indirect cruelties many people take part in, such 
as buying from breeders instead of adopting or witnessing abuse/neglect of a dog or cat without reporting the 
incident. 
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this type of compassion, or these types of incomplete virtues, are highly conditional and lead 
us to be inactive or even directly harmful to animals because of the conditions which have 
been placed on the virtues we learn. 
These inconsistencies are also found beyond humans, in our mixed feelings about 
animals themselves.  In the United States, there are high levels of adoration for companion 
animals, namely dogs and cats. Our incomplete virtues thus expand to them as well but in 
different scenarios. In the example above about the wounded bird, if we were to switch that 
scenario to being a wounded cat and someone walked by without even attempting to help, I’d 
gather many people would view this as highly uncompassionate and would see this action as a 
vice (whereas, I’d again gather, only some people would see this situation as a vice if it 
involved a wild bird). Commonly, we are to not harm the dog or cat due to what we have been 
taught about their role in our society – our virtues, thus, have guided our responses to them 
through how we have been taught from parental figures telling us to be kind to a cat or laws 
amending companion animals’ place in society as not just ‘property’ like all other animals, 
but instead as ‘pets.’ They are, under the law, still titled as property but dogs and cats have a 
special condition which protects them, through the law, from gross abuse and neglect while 
other animals do not have this same condition. (Animal Law) We then take these types of 
conditions and use them in establishing and assessing our own virtues. If the laws or our 
parents or our society in general says it is okay to be indifferent, or sometimes even cruel, to 
animals with the exception of companion animals, then doing just that will not make one 
uncompassionate in one another’s view. We are then saved from having to be held responsible 
for our decisions against animals with moral value; we are free to be uncompassionate under 
this current incomplete virtue set while still being praised as a compassionate human being. 
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Again I argue the animal liberation movement cannot move forward fast enough with foolish 
and inconsistent ideas such as these. 
 
Laws and Role Modeling Behavior 
 In reference to laws and the inconsistencies found in our laws, I turn to them to argue 
how they could potentially be the largest asset to the animal liberation movement not only in 
terms of actually causing mandatory change (such as a law which places strict regulations on 
agricultural practices and is then enforced) but also in regards to how the majority of people 
then would connect their actions towards animals to their ability to flourish in life. Questions 
would be raised as to why the laws care about animals? What made animals substantial 
enough to be protected fully by laws? And what part do I play in following these laws? A 
major piece of virtue ethics is to evaluate and reevaluate your decisions and intent behind 
such decisions, checking for and remedying inconsistencies. (Hursthouse, 1999) If laws were 
to better suit a complete-virtue standard, these questions would arise more frequently and be 
addressed more adequately. In other words, more attention would be brought to people’s 
inconsistencies in their virtues, as incomplete. 
 Laws are not morality’s source and not all laws dictate morality; while the two are not 
synonymous for each other, this does not mean the two do not play a pivotal role in each 
other’s existence. It almost goes without saying that laws dictate our behavior. We are taught 
to follow laws, to obey them to both avoid punishment and to lead a harmonious life within 
society. Many of the laws that are in place and enforced are those critical to our society’s 
functionality – the ability for our society to thrive in terms of being successful, safe, and fair – 
and the language in which a particular law is written is how we receive information of what is 
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acceptable and what is unacceptable. The laws are essentially written documents, both for the 
sake of preservation and for fairness and equality in understanding. Laws must be widely 
available and spread throughout the areas in which it covers (About Humanism) for them to 
be accessible to everyone and for everyone to rationally be held accountable. We learn much 
of what is deemed right and wrong by society from such laws. 
 Laws must also be ambiguous enough to be interpreted for many situations yet 
specific enough to provide clarification of intent. Currently, however, laws dealing with the 
protection of animals have jolted towards the ambiguous side so far that many of its 
interpretations are in favor of anthropocentric gain, rather than true protection for the animal’s 
sake. There is a widespread lack of clarification on how one should treat animals both morally 
and legally, and this trickles into our current understanding of virtuous behavior and what it 
means to live a ‘good’ or ‘right’ or ‘virtuous’ life in our dealings with animals; namely, this 
understanding is very confused and schizophrenic. It is this same sentiment in which I argue 
of why action is not enough; if one were to tell someone to act morally based on a certain law 
and they follow what is said, they could act in one of two ways: 1.) they act in accordance to 
the law after deciding it is what they morally feel is correct or virtuous or, 2.) they act in 
accordance to a law because they wish to avoid punishment. Now, let us say, this law to be 
followed is ambiguous and concerns the treatment of companion animals.5 This person is 
lawful, so there is no concern over whether they will follow the law, but they are not whole 
hearted, or in other words, do not possess complete virtues in their concern for animals or 
their concern for animals’ placement in their own lives, so they take this ambiguous law in the 
most relaxed position possible: following the code of the law while disregarding the question 
                                                 
5
 I use “companion animals” instead of what the law refers to as “Pets,” or worse, “property,” due to the more 
positive connotation associated with it. 
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of whether it is morally correct or virtuosic in character. They then find it acceptable to beat 
their dog, which leads to severe injuries, because of one frustration or another. The attempt at 
avoiding punishment by abiding by an ambiguous law that fails to assert moral value for 
animals while not necessarily being concerned about the animal is often the case in the United 
States.  
An example of this is the ambiguous terminology of how the law defines ‘animal.’ For 
instance, The Humane Slaughter Act (HSA) was introduced due to high demand from the 
public in 1958 for protection laws of ‘livestock’ animals yet makes rather funny references to 
what is and is not an animal and what is “humane.” 
No method of slaughtering or handling in connection with slaughtering shall be deemed to 
comply with the public policy of the United States unless it is humane. Either of the following 
two methods of slaughtering and handling are hereby found to be humane: 
(a) in the case of cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine, and other livestock, all animals 
are rendered insensible to pain by a single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical or 
other means that is rapid and effective, before being shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut; 
or 
(b) by slaughtering in accordance with the ritual requirements of the Jewish faith or any 
other religious faith that prescribes a method of slaughter whereby the animal suffers loss of 
consciousness by anemia of the brain caused by the simultaneous and instantaneous 
severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument and handling in connection with 
such slaughtering.(Animal Law) 
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 Firstly, the detailed listing of species of animals protected by this law in (a) while only 
stating after words “other animals” leaves much room of ambiguity. Specifically, it leaves out 
poultry species such as ducks, chickens, and turkeys, from its list of animals. Instead, they are 
to be assumed under “other animals” without specification. Referring back to the person who 
does not have complete virtues concerning animals but rather only looks at the law in terms of 
abiding by what it says to avoid punishment, we are able to see a large problem with this type 
of ambiguity. Let us expand this person as a factory farm owner; he would have no need to 
specifically apply this law to types of poultry, such as chickens. This law also does not protect 
the animal during his or her life but only provides some protection during their slaughter. 
Again, leaving open much debate as to how an animal should be treated during their actual 
lifetime. So, once again, it is not until our virtues include animals that many individuals will 
actually go out of our way (although I beg the question as to whether it actually is as big of an 
inconvenience as some claim) to protect, help, or otherwise leave them alone.  
 Some argue virtue ethics is egotistical in that it only instructs people to be good in 
order to be a virtuous person – necessary to live a flourishing life – instead of being good for 
the sake of being good. I would like to respond to this in two separate parts; 1.) Other ethical 
theories also have this ‘problem,’ and 2.) I argue it is not so much of a problem but rather, a 
side effect. So, first, deontology and utilitarianism also struggle with egoism. If one were to 
visit a friend in the hospital under deontology, they’d be visiting due to following a rule-set 
which establishes one to be compassionate. If one were to visit a friend in the hospital under 
utilitarianism, they’d be visiting due to the principle of maximizing happiness (assuming the 
friend would be happy to see the person) and minimizing pain. If one were to visit a friend in 
the hospital under virtue ethics, they’d be visiting due to being a virtuous person and doing 
Rader 29 
 
what a virtuous person would characteristically do. (Hursthouse, 1999) However, I think this 
objection ignores the possibility of this not mattering all that much. For virtue ethics, intention 
matters greatly in why someone is performing an action and while the intention may have a 
side effect of involving being a virtuous person and living a flourishing life, it does not seem 
to be assuming too much to state a virtuous person would be someone to deeply care for their 
friend and want to visit them in the hospital for the friend’s own sake.  
I mention this objection because of, as I have stated, relating our actions with animals 
as being meaningful for our own lives – not just theirs. While obviously it would probably be 
more beneficial for someone to care both about themselves and the animals, I do not think it 
necessarily has to be because someone ‘loves’ animals or feels bad for them. Rather, if one 
were to decide not to partake in actions which harm animals because they understand animals 
have moral value and are worthy of such consideration and that in taking such actions they’re 
then able to live a flourishing life, I believe this to be perfectly acceptable. Egoism, if coupled 
with other reasons, is not bad or wrong. It could be a very strong tool for change because it 
gets right to the individual and their own lives, usually providing the most motivation to act. It 
is this type of incorporation between what Singer and Regan did and what virtue ethics does 
which moves me to argue virtue ethics as the animal liberation movement’s missing link. 
Usually it does take a personal impact to evoke someone to change their behavior. 
With the idea of egoism, or self-interest, many people do not break laws when they 
perform violent actions towards animals and are protected against responsibility from such 
actions. While there are provisions regarding how far they’re allowed to take this violence, 
factory farm workers, for example, perform violent procedures against animals daily and 
receive payment for these actions. By law, if an action is seen as routine in the business of 
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agriculture, it is permissible to perform. For example, the clipping of baby chicks’ beaks 
without anesthesia, a highly painful procedure, is noted as “common husbandry practices” so 
is allowed to occur consistently to almost every chicken used in factory farming, whether they 
are “egg-laying hens” or “broiler chickens.” (Animal Welfare) These actions are inconsistent 
with being a completely virtuous person but are parts of the rules, or laws, which large 
amounts of individuals in the United States learn their behavior of right and wrong from.  
The schizophrenia found in law about animals reflects the schizophrenia we have in 
our virtues. We may love our dog yet eat parts of a cow and since it is perfectly acceptable 
and lawful for a virtuous person to eat meat, the slaughtering of billions of animals annually 
continues (HSUS) without too much thought as to how these practices reflect our virtues. 
Ultimately, we are tied to a system that encourages schizophrenic reasoning in our dealings 
with animals; our agreement with animals being worthy of moral value, even to a very slight 
degree, typically do not match our actions. One may treat their dog like a member of the 
family, yet have steak for dinner and take trips to zoos, circuses, and rodeos. It is this lack of 
consistency which is at the root of why the progression of expanding moral concern to 
animals has been stalled so frequently and it is this lack of consistency which virtue ethics 
aims to remedy. 
If virtue ethics is more readily applied, eventually it most likely would no longer be 
socially acceptable to pursue detrimental actions towards animals, but rather these actions 
would be looked at as warranting an explanation or defense; no longer would those who are 
consistent in their ideals and actions be asked to defend themselves of why they do not use 
animals negatively.  Instead, this would be reversed.  
Rader 31 
 
All of this, however, brings us into how these types of virtuous teachings should or 
more importantly, could be applied to laws. Laws are, of course, slow changing and follow 
precedent. This is where I argue firmly I am not under the fanciful belief this paradigm shift 
will occur over night but instead that it is one of several tools to use in our attempts to make 
more consistent, fluid, and complete virtues for ourselves through the inclusion of animals. 
From this, I’d also argue it is within the laws the animal liberation movement has, and will, 
face its greatest resistance because of the massive power it would bring to those who wish to 
act in accordance with animals’ moral value. It could be objected that my reasoning seems 
circular: I am saying we should change laws to better reflect complete virtues which include 
animals to teach us to follow these virtues but in order to change the laws to do just this we 
need to be the type of virtuous person who would include animals. As much as this would be 
true if there was no one with complete virtues of including animals, this need not be an issue. 
There are, by empirical evidence of veganism gaining popularity, media coverage on gross 
abuse/neglect cases of animals, and the like, those who already do include animals in their 
virtues in order to lead a flourishing life. This process would begin with them. 
 
A Call to Action 
From these people who endorse complete virtues, we will begin establishing such 
teachings and such law changes. There has to be, however, a stronger advancement of these 
beliefs and our reasons for such beliefs: not just in terms of the animal but the human as well. 
In a way, this is a call to action; applying virtue ethics to animals is, as I have argued, 
essential in the animal liberation movement progression but again, it is up the humans 
involved in order to make the decisions necessary for it to work. Just as with other social 
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movements, such as women suffrage, it takes much advocacy and a lot of time for there to be 
a large-scale difference. Looking towards the human instead of only concentrating on the 
animals will help facilitate just this. 
These changes for the benefit of animals really do rely on those who already have 
even some inclination towards thinking about animals as beings with moral value. I then urge 
those people with this inclination to examine their beliefs, struggle with and remedy their 
inconsistencies, and begin pressing complete virtues as being exemplar of what it actually 
means to be a virtuous person, even by simple actions of not considering someone as 
compassionate if they are uncompassionate to animals or not remaining inactive if one is 
being uncompassionate towards an animal. If someone agrees with Singer and/or Regan’s 
arguments for animals’ moral value, or if they turn to virtue ethics completely for action 
guidance with animals’ moral value, it is here where we can then apply responsibility to the 
human to abide by these arguments in a realistic way. It is here, with small steps of 
completing our virtues, we will see the biggest positive change for animals’ and, in many 
ways, for ourselves. 
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